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1. Introduction 
Thought and language are uniformly acknowledged to be distinct phenomena 
requiring distinct philosophical treatment. Thought is one thing; language another. 
Nonetheless, they are intimately related. According to Frege, ‘The thought, in itself 
immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a sentence and thereby becomes 
comprehensible to us. We say a sentence expresses a thought’ (Frege, 1918: 292). 
Abstracting away from Frege’s commitment to the immateriality of thoughts, the 
assumption that sentences express thoughts is widely accepted. It has, however, led to 
a near-ubiquitous identification between the linguistic meanings of non-indexical 
sentences on the one hand and the contents of the thoughts expressed by those 
sentences on the other. The identification is embedded in the widespread practice of 
appealing to a single proposition to specify both the semantic content of a non-
indexical sentence and the content of the thought thereby expressed. Thus the 
semantic content of the sentence ‘Marriage is a legal union of two people’ is taken to 
be the proposition that marriage is a legal union of two people, which proposition is 
also taken to be the content of the thought the sentence expresses. At the level of 
words rather than sentences, the terms ‘linguistic meaning’ and ‘concept’ are typically 
treated as synonyms, as evidenced by the widespread practice amongst philosophers 
of switching freely between the two, often within a single sentence. What is said and 
what is thought are thus typically treated as identical.1 
But the identification of what is said and what is thought is, I will argue, a 
mistake. It involves a conflation of two distinct phenomena. In this paper, I outline an 
externalist account of linguistic meaning and an externalist account of thought content 
that clearly distinguishes the two.2 I advocate, instead, a dual-aspect theory of 
                                             
1 The practice is so widespread that providing references would be an impossible task. 
2 The view and its implications for meaning-shift are presented in Sawyer (2018). In the current paper I 
discuss a wider range of issues, focusing in particular on the nature and value of conceptual 
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representation according to which sentences have semantic contents and express 
thoughts. Crucially, the two are not only theoretically distinct but diverge in actual 
cases. Indeed, for creatures like us, divergence is the norm.3 Understood primarily as 
a thesis about terms rather than sentences, the externalist, dual-aspect theory of 
representation maintains that non-indexical linguistic terms such as ‘whale’, 
‘number’, ‘explanation’, ‘fairness’, ‘marriage’ and ‘gender’ have linguistic meanings 
and express concepts. Linguistic meaning is here to be understood as linguistically 
encoded content rather than as reference or denotation; and concepts are to be 
understood as representational constituents of thoughts individuated at the level of 
sense rather than reference.4 Here too, the crucial point is that the linguistic meaning 
of a non-indexical term and the concept expressed by that term are not only 
theoretically distinct but diverge in actual cases. This is because, on the account I 
offer, linguistic meanings and concepts track different phenomena and play different 
explanatory roles.  
The distinction, understood along the lines I propose, brings theoretical gains 
in a cluster of related areas. It provides an adequate account of meaning change across 
time, it accounts for the possibility of substantive agreement and disagreement across 
different theoretical frameworks, it accommodates at face value the phenomenon of 
contested meanings, and it explains both the nature and the value of conceptual 
engineering, placing the phenomenon of conceptual engineering in a framework of 
theoretical change more broadly understood in a way that addresses recent prominent 
concerns. 
A caveat before we begin. The current paper is focused on non-indexical terms 
only. I set aside discussion of indexical terms, such as ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ as well as 
of proper names, such as ‘London’ and ‘Sarah’, which I have argued elsewhere 
should be understood as containing an indexical element in their singular use.5 
Indexical terms require separate treatment.6 I focus instead on the claim that the 
                                             
engineering. The distinction between linguistic meaning and thought content can be found in Burge 
(1986). 
3 As will become clear, narrowing the divergence between the two is the upshot of successful inquiry. 
See section 6 below. 
4 See Frege (1892). 
5 For my view on proper names, see Sawyer (2010), which has its roots in Burge (1973). 
6 For present purposes, I take as an indexical term any term which requires a contextual application in 
order to determine a referent. That is, roughly, any term that admits of a content/character distinction in 
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linguistic meaning of a non-indexical term should be distinguished from the concept 
expressed by that term. This is where the theoretical gains lie.  
 
2. The Background: Internalism and Externalism 
The (problematic) identification of the linguistic meaning of a non-indexical term and 
the concept expressed by that term sits most naturally within a thorough-going 
internalist theory of both thought and language. Internalism about thought and 
language are defined by their commitment to a local supervenience thesis according 
to which what a subject thinks and what she means by her words are each determined 
by her intrinsic (typically physical) states. Internalist theories of thought and language 
are designed to capture the way the world seems from the individual’s perspective 
narrowly construed.7 Concepts and linguistic meanings, then, understood as the 
internalist understands them, are determined by the same set of intrinsic facts and are 
invoked to capture a single phenomenon, namely the subject’s individual, perceptual, 
discriminatory capacities and inferential dispositions which together inform her 
deployment of a concept and her use of a term. This means that within a thorough-
going internalist framework, not only is there no reason to distinguish the linguistic 
meaning of a term from the concept expressed by that term, there is also no means of 
doing so. It is precisely this feature of a thorough-going internalist theory that, I 
maintain, precludes it from providing an adequate account of phenomena such as 
meaning change, substantive agreement and disagreement across different theoretical 
frameworks, and the nature and value of conceptual engineering. I return to this issue 
in section 6 below.  
A distinction can be drawn between the linguistic meaning of a term and the 
concept expressed by that term only within a framework that distinguishes between 
the facts that determine the former and the facts that determine the latter. A thorough-
going internalist framework does not have the resources to do this, but a thorough-
                                             
the sense of Kaplan (1989). Indexical terms do not obviously express concepts – or, at least, are not 
guaranteed to express a single concept across different occasions of use; and the semantic content of a 
sentence containing an indexical term is not obviously identical to the content of the thought expressed. 
Which terms fall into this category is a matter of debate. 
7 See for example Fodor (1980, 1987), Stalnaker (1990), Segal (2000) and Chalmers (2003). For an 
internalist account of linguistic meaning most relevant to the concerns of the present paper, see Sundell 
(2011, 2012) and Plunkett and Sundell (2013).  
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going externalist framework does.8 In fact, Putnam’s original introduction of 
externalism to the mainstream literature provides the means to distinguish the two, but 
his exclusive focus on language obscures this important insight. Putnam, concerned 
with language rather than thought, identifies two elements that he claims are missing 
from traditional semantic theories.9 The first is the contribution of society, and the 
second is the contribution of the real world. The contribution of society is illustrated 
by Putnam’s example involving his incomplete understanding of the terms ‘beech’ 
and ‘elm’, and brings in the core notion of linguistic deference, which he articulates 
as deference to ‘experts’. The contribution of the real world is illustrated by Putnam’s 
notorious Twin Earth thought experiment involving the term ‘water’, and brings in the 
core notion of causal relations to natural kinds with hidden essences. My suggestion, 
elaborated throughout the paper, is that the contribution of society to representation is 
best understood as a contribution to language and the contribution of the real world to 
representation is best understood as a contribution to thought.10  
It is reasonable to think not only that the contributions Putnam identifies can 
be understood as contributions to different phenomena, but, in addition, that they 
cannot be seen as contributions to a single phenomenon, whether that be to language, 
as Putnam maintains, or to thought. This is because there is a tension between the two 
contributions, a tension which is masked by an ambiguity in the notion of an ‘expert’.  
It is standard in the externalist literature to assume that an expert is someone who is 
knowledgeable about the relevant subject matter. On this understanding, the 
contribution of society and the contribution of the real world would necessarily be 
aligned. On this view, the linguistic meaning of an individual’s term is determined 
either by causal relations to the real world, or by deference to experts, the linguistic 
meaning of whose term is determined by causal relations to the real world. Either 
                                             
8 ‘Mixed’ theories which combine an internalist theory of thought and an externalist theory of 
language (or vice versa) also have the resources to do this; indeed, they necessarily entail a distinction 
between the linguistic meaning of a term and the concept expressed by that term, although this 
implication has not generally been explored. I do not discuss such theories in the paper because the 
way in which they draw the distinction does not imply the theoretical advantages with which I’m 
concerned. For examples of mixed theories of the first kind see Putnam (1973, 1975) and Crane (1991). 
I know of no-one who holds a mixed theory of the second kind and can see little motivation for such a 
view. 
9 See Putnam (1973, 1975). 
10 As will become clear, I take the contribution of the real world to extend far beyond what is given by 
causal relations to natural kinds with hidden essences. 
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way, linguistic meaning is determined at root by relations to the real world; the only 
question is whether the determination relation is direct or indirect.11  
But the claim that linguistic deference involves deference to those who are 
knowledgeable about the relevant subject matter is an idealisation, and one which 
cannot play the central role required of it in an account of actual linguistic deference. 
Linguistic deference must be deference to other members of one’s linguistic 
community, and these may not be experts in the sense of being knowledgeable about 
the relevant subject matter. The history of science is the history of experts who were 
wrong, sometimes significantly so, about the subject matter that fell into their area of 
expertise. It would be wrong to conclude that they were not experts after all; on the 
contrary, to be an expert is to be worthy of deference despite the possibility of error. 
This fits with our actual linguistic and sociological practice surrounding the term 
‘expert’.  
We must reject the standard externalist assumption, then, that an expert, for 
the purposes of linguistic deference, is necessarily someone who is knowledgeable 
about the relevant subject matter. Rather, an expert is, roughly, someone to whom 
others defer not because they are knowledgeable but because they are perceived to be 
so. Being perceived to be knowledgeable does not, of course, preclude being 
knowledgeable; but being knowledgeable is neither necessary nor sufficient for being 
perceived to be so. Note, however, that on this more realistic, less idealised 
understanding of an expert, linguistic deference provides no guarantee that the 
linguistic meanings of our terms hook up with the real world in the way that is 
supposed to be secured by direct causal relations. This is because the way the experts 
take the world to be may be different from the way the world is.12 The contribution 
of society and the contribution of the real world will therefore sometimes take us in 
different directions. To resolve the tension, the two contributions that Putnam 
identifies not only can, but should be seen as contributions to different phenomena.  
                                             
11 It is a mistake to think that the contribution of the real world is relevant to natural kind terms 
whereas the contribution of society is relevant to non-natural kind terms. Drawing the distinction along 
these lines is clearly not true to Putnam’s original discussion which uses examples of natural kind 
terms such as ‘beech’ and ‘elm’ to illustrate the phenomenon of linguistic deference. It also fails to do 
justice to the hidden depths of the natural world, the reality of the non-natural world and the 
fundamental role of linguistic deference in language-learning.  
12 Errors may be both theoretical, in the form of false beliefs, and practical, in the form of 
misapplications of words and incorrect deployment of concepts. 
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The contribution of society to representation, I suggest, is to be understood as 
a contribution to language, and the contribution of the real world to representation is, 
I suggest, to be understood as a contribution to thought. These distinct ‘external’ facts 
ground a theoretically significant distinction between the linguistic meaning of a term 
on the one hand and the concept expressed by that term on the other. I take the 
distinction to be general, applying to terms across a broad range of disciplines and 
areas of inquiry. The distinction is not restricted to natural kind terms, or to empirical 
terms more broadly construed, but extends beyond the empirical realm to 
mathematical, logical and philosophical terms as well as to normative terms, 
including social and ethical terms. In what follows, I provide an externalist account of 
linguistic meaning and an externalist account of concepts, and I demonstrate some of 
the theoretical gains of distinguishing the two. 
 
3. Linguistic Meaning  
I take linguistic meaning to supervene on use. I reject the internalist claim, however, 
that the linguistic meaning of a term as used by a given individual depends solely on 
her use of the term. There is often widespread variance in the use of a term by 
different individuals across a community, but this variance is consistent with a term’s 
having a single meaning for all. Linguistic meaning in this communal sense is what 
dictionaries aim to record. They achieve this aim, in so far as they do, not by 
recording statistical averages across individual usage but by paying attention to 
patterns of usage and deference across the community. Patterns of deference reflect 
our general recognition of the fact that, for any given term, some individuals are more 
competent in its use than others. It is the use of the most competent together with 
patterns of deference amongst all (including the most competent) that determines 
linguistic meaning.  
Linguistic deference is a much more general phenomenon than is sometimes 
recognised, applying to most, probably all, terms in the language. This includes, for 
example, very basic terms such as ‘red’, ‘table’ and ‘sharp’, and slang terms such as 
‘wicked’, ‘newb’ and ‘banterous’. It is the generality of the phenomenon of linguistic 
deference that makes talk of expertise misleading. Not only does the term ‘expert’ 
carry connotations of knowledgeable status, as noted in the previous section, but it 
also carries connotations of a restricted application to scientific, theoretical or 
technical terms only. This restriction is artificial, since the fundamentality of 
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linguistic deference is built into the very nature of language-learning. Talk of 
competence is preferable, even if not perfect. 
What I have said so far is couched at a relatively general level. At a more 
specific level, the linguistic meaning of a term at a time can be understood as the 
characterization of the relevant subject matter that members of the linguistic 
community would settle on at that time were they to reach reflective equilibrium in 
the context of a dialectic.13  
The dialectic, for these purposes, is an honest, open debate, shorn of all 
subjective elements, in which participants aim for a characterization of the subject 
matter through reason and reflection on actual and hypothetical cases, deferring to the 
most competent as and when appropriate. The dialectic is not to be understood as 
involving maximal reflection on the subject matter, as this would inevitably extend 
the discussion beyond actual use to what was perceived to be ideal future use. Rather, 
the relevant notion is to be understood as full reflection within actual empirical and 
theoretical boundaries, where this is consistent with the participants agreeing that the 
subject matter has not yet been fully characterized. The primary focus of the dialectic 
is the characterization of a subject matter rather than the characterization of meaning 
per se because although the questions ‘What does ‘x’ mean?’ and ‘What is an x?’ are 
different questions, the former can be, and typically is, answered by answering the 
latter.14  
Within the set empirical and theoretical boundaries, there may be terms for 
which no agreement would be reached. The account implies that for such terms there 
is no settled linguistic meaning at the time. I take the claim that at least some terms 
have no settled linguistic meaning at a time to be a natural implication of the fact that 
meaning depends on use, which is subject to flux and changes over time. I therefore 
see the implication that not every term will have a settled linguistic meaning as a 
virtue of the account. Language is organic, and this fact must be captured by an 
adequate theory of linguistic meaning. 
                                             
13 For an account of linguistic meaning along these lines see Burge (1986, 1989) and Sawyer (2007, 
2018).  
14 This point is made in Burge (1986), where it is related to the claim made in Quine (1951) that there 
is no separating truths of meaning from matters of fact. 
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Of particular significance in this context are terms with so-called ‘contested 
meanings’.15 The literature on conceptual engineering provides a set of staple 
examples, including ‘race’, ‘gender’, ‘marriage’ and ‘rape’, although terms with 
contested meanings occur across all realms of inquiry. The meanings of such terms 
are contested in the sense that different groups of people within the linguistic 
community—the conservative group and the progressive group, as we might call 
them,—disagree in fundamental ways about how the term ought to be used, where 
this disagreement is reflected by the different actual uses of the relevant term by the 
different sub-sections of the community. In such cases, the community as a whole is 
aware of the disagreement in use, but the disagreement takes place against the 
common understanding that the matter would not be resolved by a stipulative 
disambiguation introduced to accommodate the different uses. The different parties to 
the dispute, each convinced that their own use is correct, do not see themselves as 
talking past each other, but as offering different views on a single subject matter. In 
the context of a dialectic, even if each sub-section of the community were to settle on 
an agreed characterization of the relevant subject matter, no overall agreement would 
be reached by the community as a whole. The fundamental disagreement over the 
correct characterization of the subject matter in such cases splits the use of the 
relevant term and renders its meaning contested. I return to these important cases in 
section 5 below.  
The account of linguistic meaning offered accommodates the fact that the 
meaning of a term can change over time. Since meaning supervenes on use, a change 
in the linguistic meaning of a term depends on an underlying change in linguistic 
practice; and if there is a change in linguistic practice, there will be a change in the 
characterization that would be settled on in the context of a dialectic. For example, the 
meaning of the term ‘meat’ has clearly changed between Shakespearean times and 
now. The term ‘meat’ used to mean something like food in general, whereas now it 
means something like animal flesh that is eaten for food. But this is precisely the 
result that would emerge in the context of dialectical reflection on use at the two 
times.  
Given that the linguistic meaning of a term determines its extension, the 
account of linguistic meaning also accommodates the fact that the extension of a term 
                                             
15 See Gallie (1956) for an early discussion of ‘essentially contested meanings’. 
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can change over time. I take the extension of a term to be the class of entities that 
satisfy the term’s (descriptive) linguistic meaning. Thus it is because an apple satisfies 
the description ‘food in general’ that it falls into the extension of the term ‘meat’ in 
Shakespearean times; and it is because an apple does not satisfy the description 
‘animal flesh that is eaten as food’ that it does not fall into the extension of the term 
‘meat’ now. Finally, the account also provides linguistic norms by establishing how 
the relevant term ought to be used, namely in accordance with the agreed 
characterization of the relevant subject matter. I return to questions of normativity and 
truth in section 7 below. 
 
4. Concepts 
A quick internet search provides an extensive list of words that have changed their 
meaning over time, including ‘meat’, ‘spinster’, ‘bachelor’, ‘clue’, ‘awesome’, 
‘awful’, ‘wicked’, ‘girl’, ‘egregious’, ‘pretty’ and ‘hussy’. In all of these cases, and 
many more besides, the change in meaning has been accompanied by a change in 
topic, or subject matter.16 This is what makes such cases relatively unproblematic 
from a philosophical perspective.  
The more interesting cases are those for which we want to say that the 
meaning of the relevant term has changed while the subject matter has not. Such cases 
are widely regarded as philosophically problematic. To illustrate the nature of the 
problem raised by this kind of case, I start with a puzzle articulated by Sainsbury, 
although a variation of the puzzle occurs across a wide range of philosophical 
literature.17 Let us assume, as Sainsbury does, that the term ‘whale’ was embedded in 
a linguistic practice in ancient times, when people thought whales were fish, that is 
different from the linguistic practice in which it is embedded now, when people think 
whales are mammals. This, he says, raises a dilemma. Either the sentence ‘Whales are 
fish’ means the same in ancient times as now, or it doesn’t. To say that it does fails to 
accommodate the fact that meaning is determined by use; but to say that it doesn’t 
fails to accommodate the fact that there is substantive disagreement across the two 
times.  
                                             
16 Unlike technical terms such as ‘extension’ and ‘reference’, I take the terms ‘subject matter’ and 
‘topic’ to be non-technical and relatively intuitive. 
17 For Sainsbury’s articulation of the puzzle see his (2014). 
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Substantive disagreement is to be contrasted with merely verbal disagreement, 
such as the kind of disagreement that might occur over whether an apple is a form of 
meat between someone from Shakespeare’s time and someone from the present time, 
the former insisting that an apple is a form of meat, the latter insisting that it isn’t.18 
The disagreement would be merely verbal in the sense that the two parties would be 
talking past each other. One way to capture this is to note that there is no single 
content over which the parties disagree. We can stipulate that ‘meats’ is to mean what 
‘meat’ means in Shakespeare’s time, and ‘meatp’ is to mean what ‘meat’ means in the 
present. It is plausible to assume that the disputants, once apprised of the difference in 
use, would accept the stipulations and agree that apples are a form of meats but not a 
form of meatp. The dispute would not persist after the stipulation because it would be 
clear that the subject matter of the term ‘meat’ in Shakespeare’s time is not the same 
as the subject matter of the term ‘meat’ now. Disambiguation works in this case 
because it separates what are clearly two distinct subject matters. 
Substantive disagreement, in contrast, is disagreement over a single subject 
matter. The disambiguation strategy that works in cases of merely verbal 
disagreement does not, therefore, work in cases of substantive disagreement. The 
disagreement over the truth of the sentence ‘Whales are fish’ persists even if we 
stipulate that ‘whalea’ is to mean what ‘whale’ means in ancient times and that 
‘whalep’ is to mean what ‘whale’ means in the present. This is because the stipulation 
does not disambiguate two distinct subject matters; rather, it distinguishes two 
theories about a single subject matter. The question remains which theory, if either, is 
correct. The disagreement is fundamentally a disagreement over the nature of 
whales.19  
Sainsbury’s puzzle is puzzling, then, because, intuitively, we want to be able 
to say both that the linguistic meaning of the sentence ‘Whales are fish’ is different at 
the two times and that the subject matter of the sentence is the same at the two times, 
and it is unclear exactly how we can do both. The reason it is unclear how we can do 
                                             
18 On the nature of verbal disputes, see for example Chalmers (2011). Although I agree with much of 
what Chalmers says, I think the account ultimately suffers from the conflation between linguistic 
meanings and concepts that I urge in the current paper. I do not have the space to discuss Chalmers’s 
views in detail here. 
19 The boundary between merely verbal disagreements and substantive disagreements may be vague 
and will certainly sometimes appear so, given that the distinction between subject matters is not 
necessarily transparent. This is consistent, however, with there being clear-cut cases on either side of 
the boundary. 
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both is that sameness of subject matter appears to require a single propositional 
content over the truth of which the parties to the dispute disagree, and this appears to 
require sameness of linguistic meaning which directly contradicts the claim that the 
linguistic meaning of the term has changed.  
The diagnosis of the puzzle lies in the recognition that if linguistic meaning is 
the only representational element in our theory, it is subject to inconsistent 
constraints. Linguistic meaning cannot both supervene on use and determine a stable 
subject matter. This is because in order to supervene on use, linguistic meaning must 
change in accordance with a change in linguistic practice that comes about as a result 
of a change in the community’s beliefs; but in order to determine a stable subject 
matter, linguistic meaning must be insensitive to at least some changes in the 
community’s beliefs and hence insensitive to at least some changes in linguistic 
practice. No single element can do both. 
The solution to the puzzle, then, begins with the recognition that two 
representational elements are required; one to supervene on use, and the other to 
determine a stable subject matter. Of the two roles, linguistic meaning is ideally suited 
for the former. The account of linguistic meaning offered above starts from the 
assumption that meaning supervenes on use, and explains how a change in linguistic 
meaning tracks changes in a community’s linguistic practice. The second role is that 
of determining a stable subject matter. This, I maintain, is the function of concepts. 
Concepts are constituent, representational elements of thoughts that connect thinkers 
representationally to a subject matter about which individual or communal beliefs 
may vary. 
In order for concepts to play the requisite role of securing a stable subject 
matter, they must be understood as externally-individuated, fundamentally non-
descriptive components of thought. They must be externally-individuated if they are 
to determine a subject matter that can be stable across individuals with different 
individual beliefs; and they must be fundamentally non-descriptive if they are to 
determine a subject matter that can be stable across communities with different 
communal beliefs. Concepts are not individuated by individual conceptions—they are 
not individuated by the way the individual thinker takes the world to be. Nor are they 
individuated by communal conceptions—they are not individuated by the way the 
community as a whole takes the world to be. Concepts are individuated, at the 
fundamental level, by relations to objective properties. This is the sense in which the 
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contribution of the real world to representation is best understood as a contribution to 
thought. It is the fact that the subject matter itself enters into the individuation 
conditions of the relevant concept that explains how the concept expressed by a term 
can determine a stable subject matter.20  
Once two distinct representational elements are acknowledged, Sainsbury’s 
puzzle is resolved. We wanted to be able to say both that the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence ‘Whales are fish’ is different at the two times, and that the subject matter of 
the sentence is the same at the two times. This we can now do. The linguistic meaning 
of the term ‘whale’ has changed over time, but it expresses the same concept at the 
two times, and hence concerns the same subject matter; the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence has changed over time, but it expresses the same thought at the two times, 
thereby securing a single propositional content over the truth of which the 
communities can be understood to have a substantive disagreement. 
The assumption that substantive disagreement presupposes a single 
propositional content over the truth of which the parties to the dispute disagree is 
almost ubiquitous. It is questioned by Plunkett and Sundell, who argue that intuitions 
about substantive disagreement can be accommodated without appeal to a shared 
propositional content.21 It is interesting to note that both sides to this particular 
dispute assume that there is only one propositional content in question, which is both 
the semantic content of the sentence and the thought expressed by it. The mainstream 
assumes that this propositional content must be identical in cases of substantive 
dispute; Plunkett and Sundell argue that it need not be. I offer a middle way. I agree 
with the mainstream that the best explanation of our intuitions about substantive 
disagreement is that there is a single propositional thought content over the truth of 
which the parties to the dispute disagree; I agree with Plunkett and Sundell that 
substantive disagreement does not require sameness of linguistic meaning. 
 
5. Theoretical Frameworks and Contested Meanings 
                                             
20 I say ‘at the fundamental level’ to allow that there may be some descriptive concepts and some 
empty concepts. By ‘fundamental’, I mean representationally fundamental, and I take a liberal view on 
the issue and include amongst the fundamental concepts ordinary concepts such as those expressed by 
the terms ‘whale’, ‘marriage’, ‘race’, ‘gender’, ‘belief’, ‘rape’, ‘moral goodness’, and ‘justice’. 
21 See Sundell (2011, 2012) and Plunkett and Sundell (2013). 
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Distinguishing the linguistic meaning of a term from the concept expressed by that 
term in the way that I have suggested offers a solution to the question of how 
substantive disagreement can occur across theoretical divides. The linguistic meaning 
of a term at a time is determined by the received theory of the relevant subject matter 
at that time; but the concept expressed by a term is not determined by the theoretical 
framework within which it occurs; rather, the concept expressed by a term provides 
an anchor to a shared, objective world. This means that concepts may be shared 
across different communities who hold substantially different theories of the same 
subject matter. The account thus avoids a pernicious kind of conceptual relativism and 
overcomes the kind of incommensurability that Kuhn thought plagued theory 
change.22   
For the same reason, it provides a proper understanding of the phenomenon of 
contested meanings. As noted in section 3 above, we can say that the meaning of a 
term is contested when there is disagreement in use between sub-sections of the 
community and the disagreement would not be resolved by a stipulative 
disambiguation introduced to accommodate the different uses because the 
disagreement concerns the correct characterization of a single subject matter. In this 
sense, contested meanings essentially involve substantive rather than merely verbal 
disagreements. The term ‘marriage’ has a contested meaning in this sense. Use of the 
term ‘marriage’ by conservatives differs from use of the term ‘marriage’ by 
progressives, the former insisting that marriage is necessarily a union of a man and a 
woman, the latter disagreeing.23 But the disagreement would not be resolved by a 
stipulative disambiguation, with the meaning of ‘marriagec’ determined by the 
conservative use and the meaning of ‘marriagep’ determined by the progressive use. It 
would not be resolved because the progressives’ very point is that the sex of the 
individuals concerned is irrelevant to the question of marriage—that there are not two 
kinds of marriage, but one. The disagreement, then, is a substantive disagreement 
about the nature of marriage. The stipulation does not disambiguate two distinct 
subject matters; rather, it distinguishes two theories about a single subject matter. 
                                             
22 See Kuhn (1962). 
23 The relevant issue in this context is not about whether the law precludes same-sex couples from 
being married but about whether there is something about the nature of marriage that precludes it. 
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The important point to note here is that the characterization of contested 
meanings makes essential reference to the fact that they involve substantive 
disagreements about a single subject matter. This incurs an explanatory debt. We need 
an account of how it can be that a term with a contested meaning is about a single 
subject matter when the parties to the disagreement use the term in such different 
ways. The theory of concepts offered in the previous section provides the requisite 
explanation. What makes the disagreement between conservatives and progressives a 
disagreement about marriage is that the term ‘marriage’, despite having a contested 
meaning in the community at large, expresses a single concept that anchors the use of 
the term by both groups to a single subject matter. The distinction between linguistic 
meanings and concepts I have suggested, then, provides an adequate explanation of 
the phenomenon of contested meaning by explaining how a disagreement in use 
between sub-sections of society can be a substantive disagreement about a single 
subject matter. Which terms have contested meanings will naturally change over time 
as a settlement is reached for some terms and disagreement arises over others. 
Contested meanings are grounded in theoretical differences within a community at a 
time. The changing landscape of contested meanings reflects the forces of theoretical 
and social change, and is an important phenomenon for this very reason. 
 
6. Conceptual Engineering 
The phenomenon of contested meanings has an important role to play in the context 
of conceptual engineering, which also faces a number of problems that can be 
resolved by distinguishing between linguistic meanings and concepts in the way that I 
have suggested. Let us take as an example of a recent project in conceptual 
engineering Haslanger’s proposed revisionary analysis of ‘woman’.24 According to 
Haslanger: 
 
 S is a woman iff 
                                             
24 Haslanger uses the term ‘ameliorative’ and there is a question about whether and in what way an 
ameliorative analysis is to be understood as revisionary. I take the distinction between linguistic 
meanings and concepts to help clarify this issue too, but do not have the space to discuss it here. I use 
the term ‘revisionary’ because of its general applicability. 
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i. S is regularly and for the most part observed or imagined to 
have certain bodily features presumed to be evidence of a 
female’s biological role in reproduction; 
ii. that S has these features marks S within the dominant ideology 
of S’s society as someone who ought to occupy certain kinds of 
social position that are in fact subordinate (and so motivates 
and justifies S’s occupying such a position); and 
iii. the fact that S satisfies (i) and (ii) plays a role in S’s systematic 
subordination, that is, along some dimension, S’s social 
position is oppressive, and S’s satisfying (i) and (ii) plays a role 
in that dimension of subordination. (2012: 234, original 
emphasis). 
  
Revisionary analyses of this kind must satisfy two constraints: they must be both 
revisionary and conservative. They must be revisionary in the sense of proposing a 
new meaning for the relevant term, where this typically has the effect of shifting its 
extension; and they must be conservative in the sense of being an analysis of the 
original subject matter. If they do not satisfy the former constraint they are merely 
descriptive projects; and if they do not satisfy the latter constraint they have not 
provided an analysis of the relevant subject matter but have simply changed the topic. 
This creates a puzzle, since it is unclear how both constraints can be satisfied at once. 
The problem is that a change in extension brought about by a change in meaning 
appears to result in a change in topic; thus satisfaction of the first constraint appears to 
preclude satisfaction of the second.25 
The puzzle is driven by the (false) assumption that a change in extension 
corresponds to a change in subject matter, or topic. The assumption fits naturally 
within the kind of view that identifies linguistic meanings and concepts—the kind of 
view I have been arguing against. On such a view, there is a single representational 
element that determines both extension and subject matter, and hence it is possible 
(and natural) to identify (or conflate) the two. But the solution to the puzzle requires 
                                             
25 The concern is reminiscent of Strawson’s objection to Carnap's views on conceptual explication on 
the grounds that conceptual explication implies a change in extension which amounts to a change in 
topic. See Carnap (1947) and Strawson (1963). My proposal is also, then, a response to Strawson on 
behalf of Carnap. 
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their separation.26 One of the theoretical benefits of the dual-aspect theory of 
representation I am advocating is that it not only accommodates the separation of 
extension from subject matter, but it actually implies that the two are distinct and, 
moreover, that they can easily diverge. According to the account of linguistic 
meaning provided in section 3, the linguistic meaning of a term determines an 
extension descriptively. According to the account of concepts provided in section 4, 
the concept expressed by a term determines a subject matter non-descriptively. This 
means, effectively, that the extension of a term is determined by theory, whilst the 
concept expressed by a term is not. As a result, concepts can provide an anchor to a 
stable subject matter, or topic, about which there may be different proposed analyses. 
Consider this in the context of Haslanger’s revisionary analysis of ‘woman’. 
The account of linguistic meaning I have offered implies that the extension of the 
term ‘woman’ will change if the traditional meaning of the term is replaced by the 
proposed revisionary analysis. Not all women in the traditional sense are women in 
Haslanger’s sense. But the account of concepts I have offered does not imply that the 
subject matter will change as a result. This is because it is consistent with a change in 
the extension of the term ‘woman’, underwritten by a change in linguistic practice, 
that the concept expressed by the term nonetheless secures the same subject matter: 
women. Indeed, I take this to be the most plausible understanding of what is going on 
in this and many other cases of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. My 
view applies equally well, for example, to debates surrounding the nature of race, 
gender, marriage, consent, property, rape, and personhood, each of which has a 
history of revisionary analyses grounded in substantive disagreement.27 
In this sense, a revisionary analysis is not intended to describe our current 
linguistic practice but is intended as the analysis of the relevant subject matter that we 
ought to accept. This is because a proposed revisionary analysis is, in well-intentioned 
cases, an attempt, by those who take themselves to have more clearly conceptualized 
the subject matter, to initiate positive theoretical or social change.28 In effect, the 
                                             
26 This is recognised by Cappelen, who provides an alternative way to distinguish topic and extension. 
See Cappelen (2018). A discussion of the relative merits of the two approaches will have to await 
discussion on another occasion. 
27 For revisionary analyses of race, see for example Appiah (1992) and Haslanger (2012). See Clark 
and Chalmers (1998) for a revisionary analysis of belief.  
28 I say ‘in well-intentioned cases’ because it is clearly possible for someone to propose, with evil 
intentions and for personal gain, a revised analysis which knowingly subverts the truth. The idea is 
explored through Orwell’s use of the language ‘Newspeak’ in his (1949) novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. I 
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analysis contributes a revised characterization of the subject matter to the dialectic, 
thereby altering the status of the relevant term from one with a (relatively) stable 
meaning to one with a contested meaning, grounded in substantive disagreement 
about a subject matter. If the revisionary analysis is correct and accepted, the effect is 
to bring the extension of the linguistic meaning of a term in line with the extension of 
the concept it expresses (i.e. in line with the relevant subject matter); it moves 
linguistic practice closer to the truth. The analysis has to be both true and accepted to 
achieve this aim, since an unaccepted truth would not change linguistic practice, and 
an accepted falsehood would not bring linguistic practice closer to the truth. 
Conceptual engineering is, at its most interesting, the result of an attempt to uncover 
facts that we are partially aware of but have not yet fully grasped, whether 
mathematical, logical, philosophical, natural, social or moral.29 This does justice to 
the kind of normativity that underlies conceptual engineering projects by connecting it 
to questions about the way we ought to think and talk, as well as to questions about 
how we ought to act.30 
Burgess and Plunkett have raised a general concern for externalist accounts of 
conceptual engineering, responding to which will help to clarify my view. They write: 
 
The textbook externalist thinks that our social and natural environments serve 
as heavy anchors, so to speak, for the interpretation of our individual thought 
and talk. The internalist, by contrast, grants us a greater degree of conceptual 
autonomy. One salient upshot of this disagreement is that effecting conceptual 
change looks comparatively easy from an internalist perspective. We can 
revise, eliminate, or replace our concepts without worrying what the experts 
are up to, or what happens to be coming out of our taps.’ (2013a, p. 1096)  
 
The objection assumes that conceptual engineering involves revising, eliminating or 
replacing our concepts. But conceptual engineering as I understand it does not involve 
revising our concepts. Indeed, there is an incoherence to the suggestion that it does, 
                                             
restrict my focus to the kinds of examples I mention in the paper, which, I take it, are all well-
intentioned. 
29 For a mathematical example, see Frege’s revisionary analysis of number in his (1884). 
30 The importance of the normative aspect of conceptual engineering is emphasized in Burgess and 
Plunkett (2013a, 2013b). 
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both for the externalist and the internalist. So long as we assume that concepts have 
their intensions and extensions essentially, it will not be possible for them to be 
revised. Nor does conceptual engineering involve eliminating or replacing our 
concepts. This would, I take it, amount to changing the topic of inquiry, which would 
not do justice to the interest and importance of the relevant projects in conceptual 
engineering. My account, of course, has two representational elements: concepts and 
linguistic meanings. And although conceptual engineering does not involve revising, 
eliminating or replacing the former, it does involve revising, eliminating and 
replacing the latter. In this sense, Cappelen is right when he says that conceptual 
engineering is about ‘fixing language’; it is, as he says, about better ways of talking 
about a topic.31 But there are two points to note here. First, talking about a topic 
requires a representational relation between us and the topic, and one which does not 
vary with the variation in our ways of talking. This is provided, I have argued, by 
concepts that are individuated in part by relations to objective properties in the world 
beyond us. Externally-individuated concepts, then, provide the stable background 
against which conceptual engineering in the form of linguistic, and hence theoretical, 
change can take place. This means that a representational anchor to the world is an 
advantage of the account I have offered, and one which internalist theories cannot 
provide.32 Second, conceptual engineering as I understand it is a form of theorizing. 
This presents no specific problem for the externalist account I have suggested, which 
incorporates a notion of linguistic meaning that floats free from the heavy anchors of 
the social and natural environments accepted by the ‘textbook externalists’. A 
revisionary analysis, which can be proposed by any member of a linguistic 
community, will inevitably, in virtue of its revisionary status, go against the 
mainstream ‘expert’ opinion. The difficulty lies in persuading the mainstream of the 
merits of the revisionary analysis, but this is a difficulty that must be faced no matter 
which theory of representation is true. 
 
7. Truth and Normativity 
Having distinguished the linguistic meaning of a term from the concept expressed by 
that term, and hence the semantic content of a sentence from the thought expressed by 
                                             
31 Cappelen (2018). 
32 A general argument against internalism on these grounds is given in Sawyer (2007).  
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that sentence, we need to separate the elements that are appropriate to language and 
the elements that are appropriate to thought.  
One particularly important such property is truth.33 I take truth, ultimately, to 
be a property of thought. The truth-value of a sentence, then, depends on the truth-
value of the thought it expresses rather than on its (descriptive) semantic content. The 
two representational elements are governed by distinct norms: conceptual norms 
(norms of thought), and linguistic norms (norms of language). Conceptual norms 
concern truth. Linguistic norms, as stated in section 3 above, concern use in 
accordance with linguistic meaning at a time. For example, suppose that rape was 
standardly defined as possible only outside of marriage in 1800, but was standardly 
recognised (correctly) to be possible within marriage in 2000.34 The sentence 'Rape 
can occur in marriage', then, expressed the same, true thought in 1800 as it did in 
2000. But an utterance of the sentence in 1800 would have violated the linguistic 
norms of the time, whereas an utterance of the sentence in 2000 would have 
conformed to the linguistic norms of the time. This captures one aspect of the 
revisionary nature of conceptual engineering. A proposal that violates linguistic 
norms is bound to be regarded as revisionary from the perspective of the theoretical 
and linguistic practice at the time, even if the proposal correctly characterizes the 
subject matter. 
A second such property is that of analyticity. I take analyticity to be a property 
of language. As such, a statement will be analytic not per se, but only relative to a 
linguistic practice at a time. For example, the sentence ‘Rape can only occur outside 
of marriage’ was plausibly analytic in 1800 but not in 2000. I agree with Haslanger, 
and for similar reasons to the ones she provides, that the sentence ‘Bachelors are 
unmarried men’, held up as the archetypical analytic statement in the philosophical 
classroom, is no longer analytic.35 Quine was right when he said that no statement is 
immune to revision.36 However, the dual-aspect theory of representation I have been 
suggesting allows us to distinguish analytic statements from conceptual truths in a 
way in which theories that identify linguistic meanings and concepts cannot. The 
status of a statement as analytic may be relative to a linguistic practice at a time, but 
                                             
33 For these purposes I do not take any specific stand on the nature of truth.  
34 For a history of substantive disagreement concerning rape, see Hasaday (2000). 
35 See the discussion in Haslanger (2006), section VII.  
36 See Quine (1951). 
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conceptual truths are not; conceptual truths are eternal truths. The statements we 
accept as analytic, I suggest, are the statements that we take to express conceptual 
truths, and, of course, at the heart of a revisionary analysis is the claim that we erred 
in what we took the conceptual truths to be.37 
The distinction between linguistic meanings and concepts also has 
implications for the practice both of reporting what is said from across a theoretical 
divide and of reporting what is thought from across a theoretical divide. The case of 
reporting what is thought is relatively straightforward given my account. For example, 
Tilly, in 2000, can utter the sentence ‘In 1800 Abe believed that rape is not possible 
within marriage’, thereby attributing to Abe in 1800 the belief that rape is not possible 
within marriage. The practice of ascribing propositional attitudes to others is secured 
if the ascriber and the ascribee have access to the same thought, which, on the view I 
have proposed, is not jeopardised by a difference in linguistic meaning. The case of 
reporting what is said is prima facie more complicated, precisely because indirect 
speech reports are reports of what was said rather than of what was thought. As such, 
they appear to concern linguistic meanings rather than concepts, where linguistic 
meanings, I have argued, are precisely what differ across theoretical divides. How, 
then, can Tilly in 2000 report what Abe in 1800 said when he uttered the sentence 
‘Rape cannot occur in marriage’?38 Here we return to Frege’s initial claim that 
sentences express thoughts. Given this, we can say that Tilly’s report of what Abe 
said is true in virtue of the fact that it reports Abe as having uttered a sentence that 
expressed the thought that rape cannot occur in marriage. And this, we are assuming, 
is true.  
 
8. Conclusion  
In this paper, I have urged the merits of a dual-aspect theory of representation that 
distinguishes the linguistic meaning of a term from the concept expressed by that 
term. Linguistic meaning, I suggest, is determined by patterns of actual use and tracks 
a community’s understanding of a subject matter. Concepts, in contrast, are 
determined by real relations to objective properties and secure a subject matter about 
                                             
37 The theoretical benefits of the distinction between analytic statements and conceptual truths will 
have to be explored in more detail on a future occasion. 
38 Saul (2006, p. 141) raises a version of this objection against a contextualist interpretation of 
Haslanger (2000). 
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which there might be different understandings and different proposed analyses. I have 
argued that the distinction brings theoretical gains in a number of related areas. There 
is more to be said, but if I am right about the theoretical gains, then the view is worth 
taking seriously. 
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